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Summary Body ownership and embodiment are two fundamental mechanisms of self-
consciousness. The present article reviews neurological data about paroxysmal illusions during
which body ownership and embodiment are affected differentially: autoscopic phenomena
(out-of-body experience, heautoscopy, autoscopic hallucination, feeling-of-a-presence) and the
room tilt illusion. We suggest that autoscopic phenomena and room tilt illusion are related to
different types of failures to integrate body-related information (vestibular, proprioceptive
and tactile cues) in addition to a mismatch between vestibular and visual references. In these
patients, altered body ownership and embodiment has been shown to occur due to patholog-
ical activity at the temporoparietal junction and other vestibular-related areas arguing for a
key importance of vestibular processing. We also review the possibilities of manipulating body
ownership and embodiment in healthy subjects through exposition to weightlessness as well as
caloric and galvanic stimulation of the peripheral vestibular apparatus. In healthy subjects, dis-
turbed self-processing might be related to interference of vestibular stimulation with vestibular
cortex leading to disintegration of bodily information and altered body ownership and embod-
iment. We ﬁnally propose a differential contribution of the vestibular cortical areas to the
different forms of altered body ownership and embodiment.
© 2008 Elsevier Masson SAS. All rights reserved.
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Résumé L’attribution du corps propre et de ses éléments constitutifs (body ownership),
ainsi que le sentiment d’incarnation (embodiment) — le fait d’habiter ce corps, d’être
localisé dans les limites physiques de ce corps —, sont deux éléments fondamentaux de la
conscience de soi. Nous faisons ici la synthèse de données issues de la neurologie montrant
que des manifestations paroxystiques telles que les phénomènes autoscopiques (expérience
de sortie du corps, héautoscopie, hallucination autoscopique, sensation de présence) et
l’illusion de bascule de l’environnement (room tilt illusion) se caractérisent par une atteinte
différentielle des mécanismes d’attribution du corps propre et du sentiment d’incarnation.
Nous faisons l’hypothèse que les différents phénomènes autoscopiques et l’illusion de bascule
de l’environnement se caractérisent par différents patrons de déﬁcits d’intégration des
informations sensorielles corporelles (informations visuelles, musculaires proprioceptives et
tactiles) combinés à une perte de cohérence entre les références visuelles et vestibulaires.
Chez les patients souffrant de phénomènes autoscopiques, les déﬁcits d’attribution du corps
propre et du sentiment d’incarnation ont été liés à un dysfonctionnement au niveau de la jonc-
tion temporopariétale et d’autres régions corticales recevant des informations vestibulaires,
suggérant une contribution importante des afférences vestibulaires dans les mécanismes de
la conscience de soi. Nous rapportons également des données de la littérature recueillies
chez des sujets sains suggérant la possibilité de manipuler l’attribution du corps propre et le
sentiment d’incarnation par des stimulations artiﬁcielles du système vestibulaire périphérique
(stimulations vestibulaires caloriques et galvaniques) ou l’apesanteur. Chez des sujets sains, les
stimulations vestibulaires, en interférant avec les traitements multisensoriels dans les cortex
vestibulaires, conduiraient à une intégration erronée des informations sensorielles corporelles
et altéreraient les mécanismes sous-tendant la conscience de soi. Nous proposons ﬁnalement
une contribution différentielle des aires corticales vestibulaires aux différents troubles de
l’attribution du corps propre et du sentiment d’incarnation.
© 2008 Elsevier Masson SAS. All rights reserved.
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uman bodily experience is characterized by the immediate
nd continuous experience that our body and its parts belong
o us, often called self-attribution, body ownership [57,74]
r mineness [91,92]. A related, but distinct, bodily experi-
nce is self-localization or embodiment that is deﬁned as the
xperience that the self is localized at the position of our
ody at a certain position in space [84]. Recent philosophical
nd neurological theories converge on the relevance of such
odily experiences and associated processing of bodily infor-
ation as one promising approach for the development of a
omprehensive neurobiological model of self-consciousness
56,75,92]. Yet, the scientiﬁc investigation of bodily expe-
iences in general, and self-attribution/body ownership
nd self-localization/embodiment more speciﬁcally, have
roven difﬁcult and have, in our opinion, not received the
ttention they deserve given their importance for neurosci-
ntiﬁc models of self and self-consciousness [57,91,92].
A few studies have investigated the brain mechanisms
nvolved in the coding of self-attribution for body parts. Data
n neurological patients suffering from somatoparaphrenia
ue to right temporoparietal brain damage show that the
elf-attribution for a given body part may be seriously dis-
urbed. These patients misattribute one of their hands as
elonging to another person or misattribute another per-
on’s hand as their own hand [10,58,102]. Interestingly,
omparable errors in self-attribution have been induced
xperimentally in healthy subjects during the so-called
‘rubber hand illusion’’ by using a fake hand and multisen-
ory conﬂict [21]. During the rubber hand illusion, erroneous
S
e
r
welf-attribution of the fake hand is often associated with
rrors in the localization of one’s own hand [21,114]. More-
ver, neuroimaging studies have revealed that errors in
elf-attribution and localization of body parts are associated
ith activation of premotor and posterior parietal cortex
45] as well as posterior insular cortex [115].
Yet, the self is experienced as a single, coherent whole
ody representation — rather than as multiple representa-
ions of separate body parts. Studies on the rubber hand
llusion and somatoparaphrenia thus investigated only body
art ownership or the attribution and localization of a body
art with respect to the global bodily self, that is, a part-
o-whole relationship. Accordingly, these studies did not
nvestigate global bodily self-consciousness, namely local-
zation and attribution of the entire body or self to which the
elected body part is attributed (here called embodiment
nd body ownership respectively), that has been proposed
o be a key phenomenological aspect of self-consciousness
8,56,81,90—92].
In the present article we will review recent data show-
ng that ownership and embodiment can also be disturbed
or the entire body. For this, we present four different lines
f evidence about ownership and embodiment with respect
o the entire body. First, we discuss ﬁndings of disturbed
ody ownership and embodiment in neurological patients
uffering from illusory own body perceptions of the entire
ody called autoscopic phenomena [14,22,28,29,38,69].
econd, mechanisms of disturbed body ownership and
mbodiment in these patients will be compared with neu-
ological patients suffering from illusory perceptions during
hich extrapersonal space is experienced as displaced with
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Figure 1 Phenomenology and physiopathology of the autoscopic phenomena and the room tilt illusion. For each paroxysmal
illusion, the actual position of the patient’s body is schematically represented by black lines and that of the parasomatic body by
dashed lines. The direction of the visuospatial perspective is indicated by an arrow pointing away from the location where the
patient has the impression he is located. The patient has the impression to see the environment from the physical body in the
case of autoscopic hallucination, feeling-of-a-presence and room tilt illusion, alternatively from the physical and the parasomatic
body in the case of heautoscopy, and from the parasomatic body in the case of out-of-body experience. The paroxysmal illusions
are characterized by a different pattern of vestibular disturbance and of disintegration in personal space and between personal
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attributing the illusory body (see Brugger [28]; Blanke et
al. (patient 2 and 4) [14]). Localization and attribution ofand extrapersonal space. The lower part represents the hypoth
in the different form of paroxysmal illusion (TPJ: temporoparie
explanations (drawings by Lovisa Halje after Blanke et al. [14])
respect to their body (and self), called room tilt illusion
[34,108,113]. Third, we review conditions of vestibular and
multisensory conﬂicts that are prone to induce body illusions
in healthy subjects including astronauts. Fourth, neuroimag-
ing studies mapping the neural structures encoding body
ownership and embodiment will be presented. We argue
that the elucidation of the neural mechanisms of owner-
ship and embodiment of one’s entire body will be of prime
importance for the development of neuroscientiﬁc models
of self-consciousness and subjectivity.
Autoscopic phenomena
Autoscopic phenomena are illusory own body perceptions
that affect the entire body and lead to striking abnor-
malities in embodiment as well as body ownership. Four
types of autoscopic phenomena have been described: auto-
scopic hallucination, heautoscopy, out-of-body experience,
and feeling-of-a-presence (Fig. 1).1 They occur after dam-
1 Some classiﬁcations of autoscopic phenomena include feeling-
of-a-presence as an autoscopic phenomenon (as it is a reduplication
of one’s own body [26,62]), others do not (as it is not a visual
t
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el involvement of the different multisensory vestibular regions
unction; PIVC: parieto-insular vestibular cortex). See text for
ge to temporoparietal, frontoparietal or parieto-occipital
ortex and are due to distinct patterns of multisensory disin-
egration of bodily sensory information [12—15]. Autoscopic
henomena strongly suggest that not only self-attribution
nd localization of body parts, but also of the entire body
an be disturbed systematically [14,28,29]. In autoscopic
allucinations and heautoscopy patients see a second own
illusory) body in extrapersonal space, but they differ with
espect to self-attribution and self-localization with respect
o the illusory body. Whereas in autoscopic hallucinations
atients do not self-attribute and localize themselves at
he position of the illusory body, this is the case in heau-
oscopy during which patients may experience themselves
o be localized at the position of the illusory body, self-he self with an illusory body at an extracorporeal posi-
ion is complete in out-of-body experiences. In this third
eduplication of one’s own body as in autoscopic hallucinations,
eautoscopy, or out-of-body experiences [14,15,38]). Here we dis-
uss feeling-of-a-presence as its pathophysiology is relevant for
mbodiment and ownership.
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orm of autoscopic phenomena patients localise the self out-
ide their body and experience to see their body from this
isembodied location. The last form of autoscopic phenom-
na, feeling-of-a-presence, is not a visual own body illusion,
ut an illusory own body reduplication during which a sec-
nd illusory body is felt (but not seen) in extrapersonal
pace [4,28,30,31,36,73]. In feeling-of-a-presence the illu-
ory body is experienced as the body of another human.
mbodiment is normal (as in autoscopic hallucinations).
ody ownership is disturbed and absent for the illusory sec-
nd own body. In conclusion, errors in body ownership and
mbodiment during these four distinct illusory own body
erceptions range from absent (autoscopic hallucination) to
artial (heautoscopy; feeling-of-a-presence) to fully abnor-
al (out-of-body experience) ownership and embodiment
ith another body in a different position in extrapersonal
pace [12]. We predict that under adequate experimental
onditions, it should be possible to manipulate global bodily
elf-consciousness for the entire body following procedures
sed in the rubber hand illusion. In fact, recent dat suggest
hat this is the case [84,44].
The analyses by Blanke et al. [14] and Blanke and Mohr
15] suggest that autoscopic phenomena result from a failure
o integrate multisensory bodily information. These authors
roposed that autoscopic phenomena result from a disinte-
ration in body or personal space (due to conﬂicting tactile,
roprioceptive, kinesthetic, and visual information) and a
econd disintegration between personal and extrapersonal
pace (due to conﬂicting visual and vestibular informa-
ion) [see Fig. 1]. While disintegration in personal space
as present in all three forms of autoscopic phenomena,
ifferences between the different forms of autoscopic phe-
omena were mainly due to differences in strength and
ype of the vestibular dysfunction. Out-of-body experi-
nces were associated with a strong vestibular disturbance,
hereas heautoscopy was associated with a moderate and
ore variable vestibular disturbance, and autoscopic hal-
ucinations without any vestibular disturbance. Moreover,
he high frequency of visual hallucinations and hemianopia
n patients with autoscopic hallucinations suggested that
eﬁcient visual processing of bodily information is the
ain causing factor for disintegration in personal space in
utoscopic hallucinations. These data suggest that heau-
oscopy is primarily due to abnormal somatosensory (or
ensorimotor) information processing, whereas out-of-body
xperiences are due to abnormal vestibular information
rocessing (for further details see [15]). For the feeling-of-
-presence, it has been proposed that mainly sensorimotor
rocesses are disturbed [4]. With respect to body owner-
hip, these data suggest collectively that somatosensory
nd vestibular signals are of key importance (abnormal
ody ownership in out-of-body experiences, heautoscopy
nd feeling-of-a-presence), whereas visual mechanisms are
ess important (normal body ownership in autoscopic halluci-
ations). Vestibular mechanisms seem to be most important
n coding embodiment (see Lopez and Blanke [86]).
With respect to involved brain regions, early studies
mplicated posterior brain regions including the temporal,
arietal, or occipital lobe [28,38]. More recently, Blanke
nd colleagues [11,13—15,17,33] showed that out-of-body
xperiences and heautoscopy are primarily associated with
amage or electrical stimulation at the temporoparietal
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unction (TPJ) and autoscopic hallucinations with damage in
arieto-occipital cortex. This has been conﬁrmed by Mail-
ard et al. [88] and Brandt et al. [23] and in a recent
tudy of 37 neurological cases with out-of-body experi-
nces, heautoscopy, or autoscopic hallucinations due to
ocal brain damage that have been reported in the medi-
al literature since 1923 [15]. Moreover, these lesion data
uggest that out-of-body experiences are associated with
amage to the right TPJ [15], heautoscopy with damage
o the left TPJ [15], autoscopic hallucinations with damage
o the right parieto-occipital cortex [13], and feeling-of-a-
resence with damage to right and left frontoparietal cortex
31].
It has been suggested that all autoscopic phenomena
hat lead to disturbances in ownership and embodiment are
ue to disturbed multisensory bodily integration at the TPJ,
ut interfere with distinct mechanisms leading to distinct
isturbances in embodiment and body ownership. Embod-
ment and body ownership are disturbed in heautoscopy
nd out-of-body experiences due to impaired vestibular and
omatosensory (proprioceptive) information processing. In
utoscopic hallucinations, both impairments are absent or
ilder. These data suggest that the brain mechanisms of
mbodiment and body ownership are linked. Yet, the data
n the feeling-of-a-presence suggest that in some instances
mbodiment and body ownership can be dissociated as the
eeling-of-a-presence is characterized by disturbed body
wnership (or self-attribution of the illusory body) but
ormal embodiment. In this condition disturbed body own-
rship has been linked to abnormal sensorimotor processing
rather than disturbed vestibular and proprioceptive pro-
essing). Collectively, these data suggest that vestibular and
omatosensory multisensory processing, as well as sensori-
otor processing are important mechanisms in coding for
mbodiment and body ownership. In the next section we
ill review data on a neurological condition that is charac-
erized by a failure to encode the position of one’s body in
xtrapersonal space: the room tilt illusion.
oom tilt illusion
he room tilt illusion is a paroxysmal and transient tilt of the
ntire visual surrounding without mislocalization of one’s
wn body [25,108,113]. Typically, subjects report a sudden
pside-down reversal (180◦ inversion of the visual ﬁeld) or a
0◦ tilt of the extrapersonal world with respect to their body
Fig. 1, right part). The room tilt illusion may last from sev-
ral seconds to hours. In most cases, inversion or tilt occurs
n the frontal plane, but both have also been described
n the horizontal and sagittal planes [108,113]. Room tilt
llusion has been associated with lesion of the brainstem
nd vestibulocerebellar system [34,41,71,103,109,111,113],
esions of the parieto-occipital and frontal cortex (see
eview in [108]), peripheral vestibular disorders [89], and
t has even been described in healthy subjects [89,101].
Room tilt illusion and out-of-body experience share sev-
ral characteristics suggesting they are subtended by closely
elated mechanisms [14]. First, both phenomena are mostly
aroxysmal and the illusory perception can revert to a nor-
al state spontaneously or after brief eye closure. Second,
oth phenomena are associated with deﬁcits or disintegra-
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tion of vestibular otolithic cues. Out-of-body experiences
are associated with feelings of elevation and ﬂoating [14]
and room tilt illusion can be evoked by otolithic stimulation
[113] and often occurs while subjects are driving or mov-
ing [89], or in microgravity [79]. Third, for both illusions,
there is a disintegration between personal and extrapersonal
space, resulting in a 180◦ inversion between the observer
and extrapersonal space. Nevertheless, whereas during the
room tilt illusion, it is the extrapersonal space, which seems
inverted or tilted with respect to a stable observer, it is
the body and the visuospatial perspective of the observer,
which seem inverted in out-of-body experiences. Another
fundamental difference between both illusions is that in the
case of the room tilt illusion there is no disintegration of
multisensory bodily information from personal space. Fur-
thermore, the room tilt illusion is not (or has not been
described to be) associated with deﬁcits in embodiment
and body ownership as is strongly the case in out-of-body
experiences.2 Collectively, these observations suggest that
the room tilt illusion is likely a transient mismatch between
the visual and vestibular 3D coordinate maps at the cortical
level (see [24]), and that an additional cortical disintegra-
tion of body-related information (in personal space) seems
necessary to induce an out-of-body experience as well as
other autoscopic phenomena.
Manipulating body ownership and embodiment
in healthy subjects
Given the above links between body ownership and embod-
iment with disturbed vestibular cortical processing it is
conceivable that interference with peripheral vestibular sig-
nals might lead to disturbed body ownership, embodiment,
and other own-body cognitions with relevance for the neu-
robiology of self-consciousness. We will highlight several
situations that are characterized by disturbed vestibular
information processing such as weightlessness and different
kinds of natural and artiﬁcial vestibular stimulations that
are likely to disturb body ownership and embodiment.
Effects of the gravitational environment on body
ownership and embodiment
Our bodies have evolved in earth gravity and have con-
sequently adapted to a constant linear acceleration of
9.8m/sec2. Reports from subjects experiencing micrograv-
ity show that the absence of this acceleration can trigger
a number of illusory own body perceptions. This indicates
that not only the anatomy of the body is predisposed for liv-
ing in gravity; perceptual functions such as body perception
and space perception also seem to have internalized earth
gravity in a fundamental way [35,93].In the presence of gravity, weightlessness can only be
obtained by free fall and is thus normally experienced only
for brief moments. Prolonged free fall is usually created
by ﬂying an aircraft in a parabola, or ﬂying a spacecraft
2 Subjects with room tilt illusions do not seem to report disem-
bodiment, yet we were not able to evaluate whether this has been
asked for explicitly.
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n orbit around the earth. In parabolic ﬂight, the free fall
asts for about 30 sec, while in orbital ﬂight one can keep on
alling for several months. The data obtained from orbital
nd parabolic ﬂights both show that subjects have a vivid
ensation of bodily and extrapersonal up and down in micro-
ravity, regardless of their theoretical understanding that up
nd down are ‘‘meaningless’’ concepts in such conditions.
ccordingly, a range of visual and bodily illusions have been
eported, and it is reasonable to assume that these illusions
re a result of lacking gravitational signals, multisensory
isintegration, and top-down inﬂuences. Generally, the per-
ept of verticality only disappears in complete deprivation
f vestibular, somatosensory and visual cues, i.e. when peo-
le are free-ﬂoating with closed eyes [79]. Such a state is
ften described as being disoriented or having a lack of spa-
ial anchoring. It is not clear whether ‘‘a lack of spatial
nchoring’’ simply refers to the sensation of ﬁnding oneself
n an unexpected position when opening one’s eyes, or if it
efers rather to a sensation of the self-existing without space
nd embodiment. In a study on Russian cosmonauts [78],
8% of the cosmonauts experienced disorientation during
ree-ﬂoating with closed eyes. However, none of these cos-
onauts reported spontaneously about having alterations in
heir sense of body ownership or embodiment.
The most common own body illusion in microgravity is the
nversion illusion [68,78,79], ﬁrst described by Graybiel and
ellogg [59]. It is deﬁned as a feeling of the body and/or
he room (room tilt illusion) being upside-down relative
o extrapersonal space. The inversion illusion is frequently
eported in parabolic ﬂights and was observed by Lackner
79] in 66 of 68 subjects while subjects were strapped in
chair. According to this author, multiple combinations of
oom tilt illusion and inversion illusion occur. This indicates
hat there is a dissociation between brain mechanisms for
ersonal orientation and extrapersonal orientation in space:
i) the person feels like he/she is upside-down while the
oom is in its canonical orientation (e.g. the ﬂoor of the
ircraft is interpreted as being down); (ii) the person feels
pright while the room is upside-down; (iii) the person feels
pside-down in an upside-down room. Case (i) and (ii) are
eometrically paradoxical, and in these cases many subjects
eport that their visual scene appears as being reversed (e.g.
bjects to their right are seen to their left) or dissociated
e.g. objects in the center of the visual ﬁeld are appear-
ng in their correct position while surrounding objects are
nverted). In parabolic ﬂight, these illusions can be so com-
elling that the subjects assume an incorrect position when
hey are preparing themselves for the end of the parabola.
ubjects reported that touch and pressure cues had a strong
nﬂuence on the inversion illusion, which shows that in
he absence of otholithic cues, the perception of vertical-
ty and up-down orientation become heavily dependent on
omatosensory input. For instance, Gazenko (1964) reported
hat cosmonauts could control their inversion illusion by
training their muscles and thereby gaining a foothold on
heir chair. In some subjects, the inversion illusion is showing
igns of a disintegration between self and body coordinates
79]. These subjects report that their body is being trans-
ormed in a ‘‘telescopic’’ fashion into the inverted position,
hich could be a way of reconstructing the experience of
aving the sense of verticality being ﬂipped while at the
ame time the body remains strapped to a chair. This sug-
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ests a potential link between the inversion illusion and
he out-of-body experience, since both illusions involve an
nversion of the sense of up and down. However, the latter
omes with the feeling of disembodiment in addition.
Beside the inversion illusion, a wide range of states with
llusory self-location have been described in microgravity.
ornilova [77] makes a distinction between illusory body
ovement ‘‘kinetic illusions’’ and illusory body position,
ody conﬁguration, and body verticality ‘‘coordinate illu-
ions’’. Kinetic illusions of rotation occur in the sagittal,
rontal or transverse plane, with the sagittal plane being the
ost common plane of rotation. Kinetic illusions of trans-
ation are reported both along the longitudinal body axis
sometimes accompanied by a sensation of falling/rising)
nd in the left-right direction. Beside the inversion illusion,
he illusions of being in a tilted position (with reference
o some imagined vertical) are the most frequent coordi-
ate illusions. The tilts are experienced in the sagittal or
he frontal plane, with backward tilts being more common
han forward tilts, and right tilts being more common than
eft tilts. All illusions described above involve disturbed self-
ocation but there are no indications of overt disembodiment
r alterations in body ownership that have been mentioned
n these reports. Purely visual illusions without illusory self-
ocation are also common and characterized by surrounding
bjects or the whole visual scene that are perceived as mov-
ng, rotating or displaced.
We conclude that illusory percepts regarding both the
wn body and the extrapersonal space are common in micro-
ravity. Abnormal vestibular information leads to errors in
ody localization, body acceleration and body conﬁgura-
ion, but these conditions are not associated with abnormal
elf-attribution and full-blown disembodiment.
ffects of natural and artiﬁcial vestibular
timulations on body ownership and embodiment
atural vestibular stimulations (by modiﬁcation of the sub-
ect’s own body position with respect to gravity) and
rtiﬁcial stimulations of the peripheral vestibular appara-
us (by caloric or galvanic vestibular stimulation) are also
ffective experimental manipulations for investigating the
nﬂuence of vestibular cues on the mechanisms of body own-
rship and embodiment.
The fact that out-of-body experiences are more frequent
n the supine position suggests that there is a gravitational
nﬂuence on embodiment and body ownership. On the basis
f an analysis in 176 healthy subjects, Green [60] reported
hat about 73% of out-of-body experiences occurred when
ubjects were lying down (e.g. ‘‘I was lying on my back when
realized that I was hovering over the bed, looking down
n myself’’). Similarly more than 80% of the neurological
atients with out-of-body experiences were in supine posi-
ion [15]. A recent neuroimaging study in healthy subjects
howed that neural mechanisms of embodiment in TPJ and
ccipitotemporal cortex are signiﬁcantly affected by sub-
ect’s body position with respect to gravity [5]. This was
ound especially when imagined self-location was congru-
nt with the subject’s physical body position. In addition,
he authors described an activation in lateral occipitotem-
oral cortex that was stronger in the sitting than supine
s
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osition corresponding with the extrastriate body area [42]
nd lesion location in patients with autoscopic hallucina-
ions [15]. These data further point to interactions between
mbodiment, vestibular processing, and autoscopic phe-
omena at the TPJ and in the occipitotemporal cortex
Fig. 2).
In order to investigate the inﬂuence of vestibular signals
n embodiment and body ownership, artiﬁcial stimulations
f the peripheral vestibular systems have been carried out
sing caloric and galvanic vestibular stimulation (see [86]
or an overview). Galvanic vestibular stimulation has been
hown to induce strong disturbances in self-location, by cre-
ting illusory own body perceptions characterized by an
pparent tilt towards the cathode with respect to the grav-
tational vertical (for recent overviews see [52,83]). As this
llusory own body perception was observed while the sub-
ect’s head was ﬁxed, there is a clear dissociation between
he perceived body position (self-location) and the physi-
al body position (body location) that remained vertically
riented. Accordingly, we propose that this spatial dissocia-
ion between self and body location (that is very prominent
n out-of-body experiences) might reﬂect partial disembod-
ment as it can be observed in patients with autoscopic
henomena in whom vestibular illusions are often associ-
ted symptoms [14,17,83] and in healthy subjects using
ultisensory conﬂict and virtual reality [84]. This observa-
ion is supported by the activation of the vestibular cortex
y galvanic vestibular stimulations [6,32,37,46,51,85,110]
verlapping with key structures of embodiment such as the
PJ and the temporooccipital cortex [5,16].
Further ﬁndings suggest that abnormal vestibular infor-
ation inﬂuences embodiment and body ownership. Yen
ik Sang et al. [120] reported that caloric vestibular
timulations in healthy subjects may induce transient symp-
oms of depersonalization and derealisation (‘‘body feels
trange/different in some ways’’, ‘‘feeling of detachment
r separation from surroundings’’) by a disintegration in
ersonal space and/or disintegration between personal and
xtrapersonal space. In a PET study on depersonalization,
imeon et al. [106] found brain activation changes related
o embodiment in regions that have also been shown to
e activated by caloric vestibular stimulation, such as the
uperior temporal gyrus, posterior insula and inferior pari-
tal lobule [19,20,39,47,50,112]. Collectively, these ﬁndings
uggest that caloric vestibular stimulation interferes with
elf-processing and embodiment, also inducing symptoms of
epersonalization, which share several aspects with out-of-
ody experiences [105].
In addition, caloric vestibular stimulation interferes with
llusory own body perceptions of body parts. Thus, caloric
estibular stimulation modiﬁes the experience of phan-
om limb sensations in paraplegic [80] and amputated [2]
atients. These authors were able to evoke transient per-
eptions of phantom limbs in patients who did previously not
xperience such sensations suggesting a direct inﬂuence of
estibular processing on body part illusions. Observations in
rain-damaged patients also found an effect of vestibular
timulation on mechanisms of body part ownership. There
re several reports showing that caloric vestibular stimu-
ation may affect somatosensory processing in the case of
ersonal neglect (see [116] for an overview). Bisiach et al.
10] described a patient with somatoparaphrenia, (a neu-
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Figure 2 Body position inﬂuences the neural basis of embodiment. (A) Stimuli for the mental-imagery tasks. Representation of
the four stimuli used for the mirror task (MIR) and the own-body transformation task (OBT). In the MIR task, subjects had to imagine
that the human ﬁgure was their mirror reﬂection and to judge which hand was marked in grey. In the OBT task subjects had to do
the same judgment but had to imagine themselves in the position of the human ﬁgure. The correct answers are indicated under
each stimulus. Note that in the MIR task, subjects imagined themselves at their physical body position (embodied self-location)
whereas in the OBT task they imagined themselves at an extracorporeal position (disembodied self-location); (B) Event related
potential data during the MIR and the OBT tasks for supine and upright subjects. The curves represent the global ﬁeld power from
0 to 600ms poststimulation with the 12 segments of stable map topography in the different experimental conditions (front- and
back-facing human ﬁgures, MIR and OBT tasks, sitting and supine position). Segment 6 (MAPMIR, segment in blue) was found from
∼285 to 330ms and was longer for the MIR task than the OBT task in the sitting position. Segment 9 (MAPOBT, segment in green)
was found from ∼350 to 400ms and was longer for the OBT task than the MIR task in the sitting and supine positions. Segment 5
(MAPPOS, in red) was found from ∼230 to 310ms; (C): Mean global ﬁeld power of MAPPOS. The amplitude of the global ﬁeld power of
MAPPOS was higher for the sitting than the supine position in the MIR and OBT tasks; (D) Localization of the generators of MAPPOS. A
linear inverse solution localized the generators of MAPPOS bilaterally in the lateral occipitotemporal cortex corresponding with the
extrastriate body area. Adapted from Arzy et al. [5] with permission of the authors.
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ological condition in which the patient misidentiﬁed her
eft arm as belonging to her mother), whose abnormal left
rm ownership was normalized by vestibular caloric stim-
lation. Collectively, these observations suggest that body
ognition as well as body ownership and embodiment may
e manipulated by artiﬁcial vestibular stimulation.
he vestibular cortex: a multisensory network
oding for body ownership and embodiment?
he reviewed evidence of disturbed body ownership and
mbodiment from autoscopic phenomena and room-tilt illu-
ion in neurological patients as well as the effects of
icrogravity and vestibular stimulations in healthy subjects
oints to a key role of vestibular and multisensory processing
n coding body ownership and embodiment. In this ﬁnal sec-
ion, we attempt to provide a neuroanatomical framework
or the brain mechanisms of body ownership and embodi-
ent giving special reference to vestibular and multisensory
ortices.
he vestibular cortex
everal areas that receive vestibular cues have been
escribed in non-human primate cortex and human cortex
for reviews see [9,25,54,67,87,97]). Electrophysiological
ecordings in macaque, squirrel and marmoset monkeys
howed that many neurons are driven by vestibular inputs in
region that Grüsser and colleagues called ‘‘parieto-insular
estibular cortex’’ (PIVC) [61,63—65,67]. Anatomically, this
egion is located in the depth of the Sylvian ﬁssure at the
evel of the posterior insula extending posteriorly to the
etroinsular cortex as well as anteriorly to the parietal
perculum. The PIVC is considered to be the core region
f the vestibular cortex because it is strongly connected or
nterconnected with most of the other vestibular cortical
reas [67]. There is evidence that the TPJ/insula represents
he human homologue of the monkey PIVC although its
xact location in the human brain is still debated. In
resurgical epilepsy patients, Penﬁeld [98] reported that
lectrical stimulation of the superior temporal gyrus evokes
estibular illusions like ‘‘dizziness, swinging, spinning’’
case #94), ‘‘sinking feeling’’ (case #5), or that the ‘‘head
est seems to be jumping up and down’’ (case #25). This was
onﬁrmed more recently by Kahane et al. [76] who showed
hat electrical stimulation applied in different loci of the
uperior and middle temporal gyri elicited similar illusions
uch as e.g. ‘‘levitation, lightness’’ (case #9712b), ‘‘rolling
orwards’’ (case #9712c) and ‘‘head spinning’’ (case #9701)
Fig. 3A]. Congruently, epileptic patients with vestibular
urae suffer from lesions surrounding the superior temporal
yrus and the temporoparietal cortex [99,107]. This location
as also been conﬁrmed by functional neuroimaging studies
n healthy subjects using caloric and galvanic stimulation
f the peripheral vestibular system revealing unanimously
redominant activations centered on the TPJ and insula
6,19,20,32,39,46,47,50,51,70,72,85,94,95,110,112,118]
ith activations in the superior temporal gyrus, posterior
nsula, inferior parietal lobule (angular and supramarginal
yri), and postcentral gyrus. Although many regions
urrounding the TPJ/insula have been found activated,
i
v
p
pC. Lopez et al.
pinions concerning the exact location of the human
omologue of the PIVC differ (Fig. 3) [see Fig. 3B].
Although the PIVC is the core region of the vestibular
ortex, several other areas encode vestibular information
ncluding somatosensory cortex (areas 3av and 2v), supe-
ior parietal cortex (area 7), as well as premotor (area
) and cingulate cortices, and hippocampus (Fig. 3B). In
omatosensory cortex vestibular stimulations activate the
nterior tip of the intraparietal sulcus [50,85,94,112] and
he primary somatosensory cortex, near the central sulcus
20,47,50,100]. These regions represent probably the human
omologue of two monkey areas that have been found to
ntegrate vestibular and somatosensory information: area
v, at the base of the intraparietal sulcus [53] and area 3av
t the hand/arm and neck/trunk representations [66,96].
nother vestibular area has been described in the posterior
arietal cortex and was activated during caloric and galvanic
estibular stimulations particularly in the intraparietal sul-
us [50,85,112] and superior parietal lobule [118]. These
egions are likely homologous to monkey area 7 [82] and
he ventral and medial intraparietal areas [27,77] receiving
estibular information as well as visual, somatosensory and
uditory cues. There is ﬁnally evidence of vestibular projec-
ions to the primary motor and premotor cortices (including
lso the frontal eye ﬁelds), and to the inferior frontal gyrus,
n relation to the vestibular control of motor and oculomotor
unctions [6,47,50,85,94].
inking abnormal body ownership and embodiment
t the multisensory vestibular cortex
lectrophysiological [67] and neuroimaging [6,19,40] studies
howed that the vestibular cortex is a multisensory cortex
eceiving not only vestibular information, but also visual
ues (especially optokinetic cues: PIVC, area 2v, ventral
ntraparietal area), proprioceptive cues from the neck and
ower limb muscles, as well as tactile cues from the plantar
urface of the feet (areas 2v, 3av, PIVC). We believe that
hese multisensory interactions are fundamental for inte-
rating signals about body movement and body position in
pace (on the basis of vestibular, proprioceptive and visual
ues), head and body position with respect to other body
egments (on the basis of proprioceptive and visual cues)
nd body contact with respect to the ground (through tactile
ues). Only under conditions of congruent multisensory inte-
ration in this multisensory vestibular network an accurate
epresentation of body location in space as well as self-
ocation generated. Based on the reviewed evidence, we
ave proposed above (Section 2) that the different forms
f illusory own body perceptions that are associated with
bnormal embodiment and body ownership are due to dif-
erent abnormalities in multisensory integration of bodily
nformation in vestibular and multisensory cortices [12,14].
ere we will extend this model by proposing a differential
mplication of different cortical structures of the multisen-
ory vestibular network in generating the different forms of
llusory own body perceptions (see Fig. 1, lower part).
We hypothesize a double disintegration of visual and
estibular cues (disintegration between extrapersonal and
ersonal space) on one hand, and of visual, tactile and
roprioceptive cues (disintegration in personal space) on
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Figure 3 The human vestibular cortex. (A) Vestibular areas evidenced in epileptic patients. The green dotted circles represent the
localization of epileptogenic lesions responsible for vestibular illusions. Filled symbols represent the site at which focal electrical
stimulation evoked vestibular illusions (Blanke et al. [17,18]; Kahane et al. [75]) and the illusory feeling-of-a-presence behind the
patient’s body (Arzy et al. [4]); (B) Vestibular areas evidenced in healthy subjects. Vestibular-receiving areas demonstrated by
neuroimaging studies during caloric (red symbols) and galvanic (blue symbols) stimulations of the peripheral vestibular apparatus
as well as during 102 dB auditory clicks (yellow symbols). To summarize, right and left cerebral activations are reported on a lateral
view of the right hemisphere (modiﬁed after [43]). The monkey vestibular areas are indicated in bold letters: PIVC (parieto-insular
vestibular cortex), VIP (ventral intraparietal area), MIP (medial intraparietal area), FEF (frontal eye ﬁelds) and areas 2v, 3av, 6v
and 7. The human homologue of the PIVC has been localized at least at three different locations. Brandt and colleagues suggested
that the posterior insula represents the human PIVC [25] since lesions centered on the posterior insula impaired the perception of
the visual vertical and induced rotational vertigo and unsteady gait (orange dotted circle). Berthoz and colleagues suggested that
the homologue of PIVC is rather at the level of the temporoparietal junction including more anterior parts of the superior temporal
s reg
n of
ed in
o
s
pgyrus and not necessarily involving the insula [75,84], naming thi
dotted area). Recent data comparing the anatomical localizatio
mapping suggest that the human analogue of the PIVC is localiz
the other hand, that occur in out-of-body experience and
heautoscopy to be due to abnormal activity in the human
PIVC/TPJ. A key contribution of the PIVC is suggested since
single neurons in this region integrate vestibular, visual, and
somatosensory cues [61,65]. In support of this view, patients
presenting out-of-body experiences and heautoscopy have
lesions centered on the TPJ including the angular gyrus
and the superior temporal gyrus [14,15]. The implication
m
[
b
a
bion rather the ‘‘temporo-peri-Sylvian vestibular cortex’’ (green
the vestibular cortex as deﬁned by fMRI with cytoarchitectonic
the parietal operculum [45] (purple dotted circle).
f the TPJ in embodiment is suggested by neuroimaging
tudies in healthy subjects showing its key role in com-
uting the egocentric reference frame [19,55,117] and in
ental imagery/transformation involving one’s own-body
16,104,121] as well as employing embodied and disem-
odied self-location [5]. Furthermore, damage of the TPJ
nd insula would also account for the disturbances in
ody ownership reported during out-of-body experience and
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eautoscopy. In support of this view, a recent fMRI study
howed that the posterior insula is a key area for coding
wnership for one’s hands [115]. The TPJ/insula has also
een involved in the self-attribution of seen movements and
gency [48,49] and ﬁrst-person-perspective taking [119]. We
onder why there is a different involvement of right and
eft TPJ in autoscopic phenomena as there is evidence that
ut-of-body experiences are more frequent after damage
o the right TPJ causing stronger and distinct abnormali-
ies in body ownership and embodiment than heautoscopy.
his seems to be in agreement with the general observa-
ion that corporeal awareness and the experience of body
wnership are more likely dependent on the right hemi-
phere [1,7]. In healthy subjects, sense of body ownership
nd self-attribution of actions are also more speciﬁcally
elated to right posterior insula activity [49,115]. Also, there
s an overall right hemispheric dominance for the vestibular
ortex [39,46,50,51,112], and the integration of vestibu-
ar and proprioceptive cues seems to involve particularly
he right TPJ (see Bottini et al. [19]). In the case of auto-
copic hallucinations, lesion sites are mostly located in
ight parieto-occipital and temporo-occipital cortex with
ess involvement of the TPJ [13,15]. This is in line with
he more frequent visual hallucinations and less frequent
estibular illusions encountered in autoscopic hallucination
han in out-of-body experience and heautoscopy. Accord-
ngly, we hypothesize that autoscopic hallucinations may
nvolve posterior parts of the vestibular cortex like area
(see patient 5 in [14]). Because, during the feeling-of-
-presence, the illusory body is felt but not seen and the
osition of the illusory body often mimics the patients’
osture, we have speculated that sensorimotor process-
ng is disturbed, possibly at the TPJ and/or parietal and
remotor regions of the vestibular network [4,12]. The
mplication of the TPJ and frontoparietal cortex is supported
y frequent sensorimotor hemisyndromes in patients suf-
ering from feeling-of-a-presence as compared to patients
omplaining from out-of-body experience. The feeling-of-
-presence is often conﬁned to one side of the patient’s
ody, contralaterally to the brain lesion, and can appear
n combination with spatial neglect [30,31]. In line with
hese arguments, Brugger et al. [31] reported that eight
ut of 12 patients suffering from feeling-of-a-presence due
o brain damage have lesions involving the parietal cortex
cases 2, 8, 9, 11, 12, 16 and 18), and Arzy et al. [4] were
ble to evoke feeling-of-a-presence during electrical stimu-
ation of the left TPJ. Abnormal vestibular processing in the
PJ and/or parietal cortex is probably present as well since
atients suffering from feeling-of-a presence may have a
istory of vertigo (see cases 2, 3 and 4 [31]). A contribution
f the frontoparietal cortex is further supported by clinical
3] and neuroimaging data [45] showing the key contribution
f the premotor cortex in body ownership.
As during the room tilt illusion there is a failure to
ntegrate visual extrapersonal and otolithic vestibular cues,
his illusion has been assumed to be caused by interfer-
nce with the PIVC, where gravitational pathways have been
ound to terminate [25,26]. However, a contribution of the
arieto-occipital and frontal cortex has also been suggested
108]. We assume the implication of the PIVC in the room
ilt illusion to be distinct from its implication in out-of-
ody experiences and heautoscopy as during the room tiltC. Lopez et al.
llusion there is only abnormal processing with respect to
ody location in extrapersonal space without pathologies
f embodiment and body ownership. This seems related to
he absence of disintegration in personal space during the
oom tilt illusion. Thus, a single disintegration in personal
pace (autoscopic hallucination) or in extrapersonal space
room tilt illusion) does seem necessary, but not sufﬁcient
o induce disorders of embodiment and ownership that only
ccurs in states of double disintegration. Room tilt illusion as
ompared to out-of-body experience and heautoscopy may
hus have partly overlapping neural mechanisms, but also
istinct neural substrates at the TPJ.
onclusion
n conclusion, two important bodily experiences — namely
mbodiment and body ownership — have been reviewed
s they seem to be of key importance for bodily self-
onsciousness. Both global bodily experiences are disturbed
n neurological patients experiencing autoscopic phenomena
nd in healthy subjects in whom integration of multisen-
ory and vestibular bodily information is experimentally
isturbed. Embodiment is disturbed in patients with out-
f-body experiences and heautoscopy, but not in patients
ith autoscopic hallucinations, feeling-of-a-presence and
atients with the room tilt illusion. Body ownership is
isturbed in patients with out-of-body experiences, heau-
oscopy and feeling-of-a-presence but never in patients with
utoscopic hallucinations, room tilt illusions, and inver-
ion illusions. We propose that these different illusions are
elated to different patterns of pathological multisensory
ctivity in the cortical vestibular network. Particularly, the
ost dramatic form of autoscopic phenomena, the out-
f-body experience, is tightly associated with vestibular
ensations and damage to the core region of the vestibular
ortex, the PIVC. Accordingly, we believe that performing
aloric and galvanic vestibular stimulations in healthy sub-
ects will be an efﬁcient way to disturb the integration of
ultisensory bodily information and investigate the neural
asis of ownership and embodiment. We are optimistic that
uch an approach will contribute to the development of a
ascinating aim of cognitive neuroscience, namely to pro-
ide a neuroscientiﬁc theory of self, self-consciousness, and
ubjectivity.
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